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As the World Trade Organization ("WTO") enters its third decade, it
can chronicle a growing list of achievements and challenges.1 In particular,
its dispute settlement mechanism has become a consequential tool of global
governance. Early on, the WTO marked an important milestone when the
Appellate Body clarified that the WTO Agreement should not be read in
"clinical isolation from public international law." 2 By so saying, the WTO
broke free of the narrower focus that had characterized the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), announcing instead that the world's
trade rules and institutions would henceforth operate within the broader
framework of evolving international law.
One of the greatest challenges facing the WTO over its next two decades
will be how it considers "human-focused" bodies of public international law
in its trade deliberations, particularly the international law that governs
human rights and public health. The WTO's most immediate challenge will
be how its dispute settlement process treats the set of cases in which nations
acting at the behest of the global tobacco industry have challenged a set of
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Judiciary, 27 EUR. J. INT'L L. 9 (2016).
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national regulations designed to protect local populations from the grave
health consequences of tobacco addiction.3
This essay argues first that, in deciding trade disputes, WTO panels may
consider human rights and public health considerations as legitimate back-
ground concerns when conducting their interpretation of conventional and
customary international law. Second, under certain circumstances, human
rights and public health can constitute both a shield and a sword with re-
spect to national regulation. On the one hand, such human-focused consid-
erations can justify a WTO member state's use of health and human rights
concerns as a shield: namely, defending what might otherwise be seen as a
WTO violation as lawful exercises of police power authority. On the other
hand, a WTO panel can, under certain circumstances, invoke human rights
as a sword to help invalidate member state regulation. Third, going forward,
the legal battleground over global tobacco control will be an important lit-
mus test for whether WTO dispute settlement bodies take these proposi-
tions seriously.4
My bottom line is that tobacco control should be world trade law's num-
ber one human rights and public health imperative. Of all consumer prod-
ucts, tobacco has proven uniquely dangerous to human health. The massive
scientific findings on this issue are indisputable.5 In the twentieth century
alone, tobacco use killed some 100 million people worldwide: more than
both World Wars combined.6 Tobacco consumption is the world's number
one cause of noncommunicable disease, contributing to some 6 million
global deaths annually. 7 By comparison, since first reported, the widely pub-
3. Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ukraine, Honduras, and Indonesia all filed WTO tobacco cases
against Australia, which were consolidated before a single panel. See Procedural Agreement Between
Australia and Ukraine, Honduras, The Dominican Republic, Cuba and Indonesia, Australia - Certain
Measures Concerning Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and
Packaging, WTO Docs. WT/DS434/12, WT/DS435/17, WT/DS441/16, WT/DS458/15, WT/DS467/16
(May 5, 2014), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispue/cases...e/ds434_..e.htm [hereinafter Australia
- Plain Packaging]. These parties complain, inter alia, that Australian labeling and packaging require-
ments violate WTO rules by limiting or prohibiting the use of trademarks and/or geographical indica-
tions on tobacco products by requiring standardized packaging. Recently, the Ukraine dropped its WTO
claims. See Communication from the Chairperson of the Panel, Australia - Plain Packaging, WTO Doc.
WT/DS434/16 (June 3, 2015) (indicating that on May 28, 2015, Ukraine requested the panel to suspend
its proceedings). For a timeline of the key events in the consolidated WTO tobacco cases, see Where Is the
Plain Packaging Issue in the WTO?, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Feb. 25, 2015), https://www.wto.org/english/
newse/news14_e/timelinetobaccose.pdf. See generally Sergio Puig, Tobacco Litigation in International
Courts, 57 HARV. INT'L L.J. 383, 383-86, 408-12 (2016) (describing the WTO cases).
4. While this essay, and the remarks on which they were based, focus particularly on the trade law
setting in which the WTO tobacco cases cited in note 3 arise, some of the analysis equally applies to the
investor-state dispute settlement setting, where I first faced these questions. See supra note * and cases
cited therein; see also text accompanying infra note 68 (discussing a tobacco carve-out for investor-state
dispute settlement in the Trans-Pacific Partnership).
5. See Howard Kyongju Koh, It Shouldn't Take Another 50 Years: Accelerating Momentum to End the
Tobacco Epidemic, 20 CLINICAL CANCER RESEARCH 1719 (2014). See generally MICHAEL ERIKSEN ET AL.,
THE TOBACCO ATLAS (4th ed. 2012).
6. MICHAEL ERIKSEN ET AL., supra note 5, at 15.
7. See WORLD HEALTH ORG. ("WHO"), GLOBAL STATUS REPORT ON NONCOMMUNICABLE Dis-
EASES xiii (2014), http://www.who.int/nmh/publications/ncd-status-report-2014/en/.
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licized Ebola virus has killed fewer than 12,000 people worldwide. 8 Al-
though aggressive health regulation has helped markedly to reduce tobacco
consumption in the United States over the half-century, the tobacco indus-
try has simply shifted its marketing to the developing world, where tobacco
consumption has more than doubled in recent years.9 Left unchecked, in the
twenty-first century, 1 billion people are expected to die from cigarette smok-
ing.'0 Such mind-boggling statistics insist that international lawyers take a
harder look at whether and when the concept of free and fair trade can be
invoked to strike down carefully considered national regulation of a lethal
imported consumer product.
I. HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN WTO ADJUDICATION
It has long been settled that, in deciding trade disputes, WTO panels
may consider human rights and public health concerns as legitimate back-
ground for interpretation. After all, trade liberalization is fundamentally a
means, not an end. The preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement, which estab-
lished the framework for the WTO system, declares the system's objectives
not as free trade per se, but rather, fulfillment of basic human values, includ-
ing the improvement of living standards for all people and sustainable de-
velopment. 11 Such improvement cannot reasonably be achieved unless
adequate respect is given to legitimate governmental concerns regarding
public health and human rights.
Far from being a novel view, trade commentators and officials have widely
accepted this position dating back to before the WTO's founding. 12 Perhaps
8. See WHO, EBOLA SITUATION REPORT, at 2 (Mar. 30, 2016), http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/
10665/204714/1/ebolasitrep_30mar2016_eng.pdf.
9. See infra notes 69-70; see also Michael C. Fiore, Tobacco Control in the Obama Era - Substantial
Progress, Remaining Challenges, NEw ENGL. J. MED. (Aug 17, 2016), http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/
10.1056/NEJMp1607850#t-article (The decline in smoking rates among U.S. adults "has accelerated
substantially during the 7 years of the Barack Obama presidency.").
10. Lindsay Abrams, Tobacco on Pace to Kill I Billion People This Century, ATLANTIC (Aug. 21, 2012),
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/08/tobacco-on-pace-to-kill-I-billion-people-this-cen-
tury/261385/ (citing the Global Adult Tobacco Survey).
11. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement] ("[riecognizing that . . . trade and economic en-
deavours should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living . .. and expanding the produc-
tion of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in
accordance with the objective of sustainable development"); see also Appellate Body Report, United States
- Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 12, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted
Nov. 6, 1998) [hereinafter United States -Shrimp/Turtle (noting, in construing Article XX that a "pur-
pose [that) is fundamental to the application of Article XX cannot be ignored [in light of the wording
of) the preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement").
12. See, e.g., Makau Mutua & Robert Howse, Protecting Human Rights in a Global Economy: Challenges for
the World Trade Organization, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN DEVELOPMENT YEARBOOK 1999/2000: THE MIL-
LENNIUM EDITION 51, 62 (Hugo Stokke & Anne Tostensen eds., 2001) ("[T]he actual text of the GATT
reflects the recognition of supervening non-trade public values which were meant to prevail in the event
of conflict with the free trade rules in the GATT."); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights and Interna-
tional Trade Law: Defining and Connecting the Two Fields, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
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then-WTO Director General Pascal Lamy put it most directly in 2010 when
he suggested, "One could almost claim that trade is human rights in practice!
... It is [at least in part the] responsibility [of the WTO and UN human
rights bodies] to coordinate our actions in a meaningful and efficient man-
ner to ensure that trade does not impair human rights, but rather strength-
ens them." 3
In the twenty-first century, one of those human rights should be a right
to be free from preventable communicable and noncommunicable disease.
Under international law, the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR") obligates all States Parties to recognize the
right to "enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and
mental health," as well as to take steps necessary to prevent, treat, and con-
trol disease.14 General Comment 14 from the ICESCR Treaty Committee
("CESCR") states: "Health is a fundamental human right indispensable for
the exercise of other human rights. Every human being is entitled to the
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health conducive to living a
life in dignity," and such rights may be enforceable in law. 5 In the tobacco
setting, this concept should be understood to encompass the notion that
human beings have an enforceable right to avoid preventable noncommunicable
disease caused by tobacco addiction and promoted by underregulated private produc-
tion, marketing, and consumption.
29, 43 (Thomas Cottier et al. eds., 2005) ("[Slince the rights of legitimate governments derive from the
rights of their citizens[,] international trade law should be construed, in conformity with the universal
recognition of inalienable human rights. ... ); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The "Human Rights Approach"
Advocated by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and by the International Labour Organization: Is It
Relevant for WTO Law and Policy?, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 605, 606 (2004) (hereinafter Petersmann, The
"Human Rights Approach") ("The eid of the cold war has led to universal recognition in the Vienna
Declaration of the UN World Conference on Human Rights (1993) that 'all human rights are universal,
indivisible, and interdependent and interrelated' . . . and that there is a need for 'international organiza-
tions ... to create favorable conditions ... to ensure the full and effective enjoyment of human rights.'");
see also Gabrielle Marceau, WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 753, 753-814
(2002); Joost Pauwelyn, Human Rights in WTO Dispute Settlement, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE 205, 205-31 [hereinafter Pauwelyn, Human Rights in WTO Dispute Settlement] (Thomas
Cottier et al. eds., 2005) (examining, through a positive law approach, the different ways in which the
WTO can or should take account of human rights in trade dispute settlement).
13. Pascal Lamy, Speech at the Colloquium on Human Rights in the Global Economy (Jan. 13, 2010)
(emphasis added); see also JAMES BACCHUS, TRADE AND FREEDOM 470-71 (2004) (former Chair of WTO
Dispute Settlement Body) ("Trade is a means to an end. The end is freedom. Much that can be done for
the end of freedom through the means of trade simply will not be done unless politics yields to law, and
unless diplomacy yields to jurisprudence .. "); Petersmann, The "Human Rights Approach," supra note
12, at 622 ("In the several hundred dispute settlement proceedings under GATT 1947 and the WTO
during more than half a century, no conflict between GATT and WTO rules and human rights has so far
been identified.").
14. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 12, openedfor signature Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) (now ratified by 164 countries and signed by
six others, including the United States).
15. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, CESCR General Comment 14: The Right to the
Highest Attainable Standard of Health (art. 12), 1, U.N. Doc. EC.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000) [herein-
after CESCR General Comment 14]; see also Amartya Sen, Why and How Is Health a Human Right?, 372
LANCET 2010 (2008); Alicia Ely Yamin, The Right to Health Under International Law and Its Relevance to the
United States, 95 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 1156 (2005).
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Whether that individual human right can be adequately protected by re-
sponsible governments turns critically upon whether dispute settlement
bodies acknowledge that those nations themselves have a right under inter-
national law to protect public health through reasonable government regula-
tion. Because tobacco use is the world's leading preventable cause of death,
the ICESCR and customary international law do not just empower-they
oblige-national governments to regulate to protect those rights effectively.
According to the CESCR's General Comment 14, protecting that right en-
tails affirmative and aggressive government action. This includes adoption
by national regulators of "legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial,
promotional and other measures" that "prevent third parties from interfer-
ing with ... the right to health."'1 6 "Violations of the obligation to protect"
may arise from "the failure of a State party to take all necessary measures to
safeguard persons within their jurisdiction from infringements of the right
to health by third parties" including "the failure to discourage production,
"117marketing and consumption of tobacco ....
In the last quarter-century, the world community has reached a striking
global consensus regarding appropriate national regulatory tools for tobacco
control. In 1979, a World Health Organization ("WHO") report called for
the creation of an international regulatory mechanism for tobacco control. 18
Two decades later, the WHO began work on such a mechanism: the Frame-
work Convention on Tobacco Control ("FCTC"), 19 which has now entered
into force for 180 States Parties.2 0 Article 3 makes clear that the goal of this
landmark convention is "to protect present and future generations from the
devastating health, social, environmental and economic consequences of to-
bacco consumption and exposure to tobacco smoke" by authorizing regula-
tory tools designed to help countries reduce supply and demand for tobacco
products.2 1 The painstakingly negotiated convention imposes a comprehen-
sive set of obligations to implement and manage tobacco control measures,
which encompass protection from exposure to tobacco smoke; regulation of
the contents of tobacco products and tobacco product disclosures; prevention
of false or misleading packaging of tobacco products; and restrictions on
16. CESCR General Comment 14, supra note 15, 33. Cf Minister of Health v. Treatment Action
Campaign (TAC) 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (S. Afr.) (requiring the government of South Africa to provide its
residents with Nevirapine to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV).
17. CESCR General Comment 14, supra note 15, 51.
18. See WHO EXPERT COMM. ON SMOKING CONTROL, CONTROLLING THE SMOKING EPIDEMIC
39-40 (1979), http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/41351/1/WHOTRS-636.pdf; see also WHO
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL, HISTORY OF THE WHO FRAMEWORK CONVEN-
TION ON TOBACCO CONTROL 2 (2009), http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/44244/1/97892415639
25_eng.pdf.
19. WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, adopted May 21, 2003, 2302 U.N.T.S. 166
(entered into force Feb. 27, 2005) [hereinafter FCTC].
20. Parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, WHO (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www
.who.int/fctc/signatories-parties/en/.
21. See FCTC, supra note 19, art. 3.
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tobacco advertising, promotion, and sponsorship.2 2 Special care was taken
in the drafting of the FCTC to ensure its compliance with WTO
requirements. 23
In a number of international dispute settlement fora, the tobacco industry
has challenged FCTC implementation as a violation of rights granted to
states (or their nationals) under international economic treaties, of corporate
rights to engage in commercial speech and to protect intellectual property,
and of consumers' human right to consume tobacco free from government
paternalism. 24 But as noted above, human rights now stand on both sides of
the trade equation. Thus, in an interpretive dispute, the question would be
how to weigh such competing public health and human rights considera-
tions against one another, as well as against legitimate, countervailing free
and fair trade concerns.
II. HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS AS A SHIELD AND A SWORD
That leads to my second proposition: under certain circumstances, human
rights and public health concerns can be both a shield and a sword-a valid
defense against a claimed WTO violation and a valid way to challenge na-
tional action that undermines these concerns.
Human rights and public health considerations can act as a shield: they
can justify a WTO member state's exercise of the police power to engage in
what might otherwise be seen as a WTO violation. From the outset, the
22. See id. arts. 8-11, 13.
23. A joint study of the WTO and WHO Secretariats took pains to state that none of the provisions
of the FCTC are inherently inconsistent with the WTO, and many of the restrictions may well be
deemed "necessary" for the protection of public health under WTO rules. See WHO & WTO, WTO
AGREEMENTS & PUBLic HEALTH 16, 138, 304 (2002), https://www.wto.org/english/res7e/booksp e/
who-wto-e.pdf. Former Director-General of the WTO Pascal Lamy similarly explained in 2011 that
WTO rules and FCTC implementation are not incompatible. See WTO Rules and the Implementation of the
WHO FCTC Are Not Incompatible, WHO, http://www.who.int/fctc/wto fctc/en/ (last visited May 30,
2016); see also Background Paper from the FCTC/COP4(18), Workshop on Trade-related Issues Relevant
to Implementation of the WHO FCTC (Mar. 2012), hrtp://www.who.int/fctc/1-1-1-Summary-Work
shopContent EN.pdf (detailing possible provisions of WTO law that tobacco companies have raised or
could raise against sovereign nations and identifying possible defenses).
24. See, e.g., Philip Morris Asia Ltd. (Hong Kong) v. Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2012-12,
Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Dec. 17, 2015) (brought under the Hong Kong-Australia
Bilateral Investment Treaty but dismissed for lack of jurisdiction); Philip Morris Nor. AS v. Ministry of
Health and Care Serv., Case E-16/10 [EFTA Cr. Rep. 330] (Sept. 12, 2011) (concluding that the ban on
tobacco advertising, which included a prohibition on visual displays in retail locations, affected tobacco
products manufactured in Norway to the same extent that it affected imported tobacco products and,
therefore, there was no discrimination); Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd. v. United States of
America, UNCITRAL, Final Award (Jan. 12, 2011) (dismissing the NAFTA chapter 11 arbitration case
for lack of jurisdiction over claims concerning compensation for tobacco regulation measures); Phillip
Morris Brands Sarl v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Request for Arbitra-
tion, 43 (Feb. 19, 2010); see also Myron Leving, Tobacco Industry Uses Trade Pacts to Try to Snuff Out Anti-
smoking Laws, NBC NEWS (Nov. 29, 2012), http://openchannel.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/11/29/
15519194 -tobacco-industry-uses-trade-pacts-to-try-to-snuff-out-anti-smoking-laws?lite (stating that
the tobacco industry was paying the legal fees of Ukraine, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic in
order for these countries to bring WTO cases against Australia challenging its plairi-packaging laws).
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GATT's drafters included Article XX, which provided that "nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by
any contracting party of measures," inter alia, "necessary to protect public
morals," "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health," or
"relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such mea-
sures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic pro-
duction or consumption. "25 On their face, measures to protect "human...
life or health" against disease, such as those taken under the Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control, would seem to fall within this language.
Other WTO Agreements include similar language, such as the Agreement
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures ("SPS") and the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade ("TBT"). 26
As originally conceived, Article XX was designed to be a fundamental
building block of the world trading system. Yet in two of the most impor-
tant GATT opinions before the WTO's founding-Thailand - Cigarettes27
and United States - Tuna/Dolphin J1S-the GATT panels construed Article
XX so narrowly as to limit its meaningful application. Those cases devel-
oped the constricted notion that regulatory measures could only be justified
under Article XX if a less trade-restrictive alternative to achieve the policy
objectives in question were not reasonably available. 29 But since it is rare
25. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Star. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT].
26. See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanirary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Mar-
rakesh Agreement, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493 [hereinafter SPS Agreement] ("[r]eaffirming that no
Member should be prevented from adopting or enforcing measures necessary to protect human, animal or
plant life or health"); Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement,
Annex IA, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter TBT Agreement] ("[r]ecognizing that no country should be
prevented from taking measures necessary to ensure the quality of its exports, or for the protection of
human, animal or plant life or health, or the environment"). Significantly, the Doha Declaration regard-
ing trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights ("TRIPS") and public health also states: "We
agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent members from taking measures to
protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we
affirm that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of
WTO members' right to protect public health ...." See World Trade Organization, Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health of 14 November 2001 ("Doha Declaration"), 4, WTO Doc.
WT/MIN(01)/Dec/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002), https://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist e/min0le/
mindecl tripse.htm. But because GATT Article XX does not apply to TRIPS, which also lacks a gen-
eral exceptions clause, it remains unclear whether a WTO panel would invalidate an apparently direct
violation of intellectual property rights protected by the TRIPS that also contributed directly and sub-
stantially to a grievous injury to public health.
27. Panel Report, Thailand- Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, 72-75,
GATT Doc. DS10/R -37S/200 (adopted Nov. 7, 1990) [hereinafter Thailand - Cigarettes] (finding that
Thailand's import restrictions on cigarettes and other tobacco products were inconsistent with the GATT
and not justified as "necessary" for public health under GATT Article XX(b)).
28. Panel Report, United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc. DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991)
(panel report ultimately not adopted, but providing notable commentary for later disputes, particularly
with respect to extraterritorial environmental regulations and measures based on processes or production
methods),
29. In the pre-WTO case of Thailand - Cigarettes, for example, Thailand's regulations were found to
be inconsistent with trade obligations because less trade-restrictive measures could be identified. But
even then, the panel sukgested that the less trade-restrictive approach permitted regulation of local
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that one could not imagine some less trade-restrictive policy tool that could
hypothetically achieve a given objective, this interpretation sharply nar-
rowed the Article XX exception.
In recent years, the WTO Appellate Body offered a more expansive inter-
pretive approach in the United States -Shrimp/Turtle case, when it construed
the term "exhaustible natural resources" in an environmental trade dis-
pute.30 Rather than woodenly seeking a less restrictive alternative, the Ap-
pellate Body interpreted Article XX to include living "endangered species"
within "exhaustible natural resources," a phrase it construed in light of a
modern understanding of international environmental law as it had evolved
since the GATT was first negotiated. 31 By so saying, the Appellate Body
suggested that when examining WTO claims, other human-focused bodies
of public international law can offer a justification that precludes a panel
from finding that WTO law has been breached.12
Jurisdictionally, WTO panels may only decide claims raised under agree-
ments covered by the WTO. 3  But Article 3.2 of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding ("DSU") directs panels to interpret WTO-covered agree-
ments "in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public inter-
national law." 34 In turn, Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties (which states generally applicable rules of treaty interpretation)
advertising. See Thailand- Cigarettes, supra note 27, 9 75, 78-81 (emphasizing the nondiscrimination
and necessity tests concerning health measures according to GATT Article XX(b)).
30. See United States - Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 11.
31. Id. 130 ("From the perspective embodied in the preamble of the WTO Agreement, we note
that the generic term 'natural resources' in Article XX(g) is not 'static' in its content or reference but is
rather 'by definition, evolutionary.' It is, therefore, pertinent to note that modern international conven-
tions and declarations make frequent references to natural resources as embracing both living and non-
living resources.") (citing Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opin-
ion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 53 (June 21, 1971) ("[Ujnterpretation cannot remain unaffected by the subsequent
development of law .... Moreover, an international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within
the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation.")).
32. The panel acknowledged that the U.S. measures to protect sea turtles were provisionally justified
under GATT Article XX(g), but nevertheless found that the measures had been applied in a manner that
constituted arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination among WTO members, contrary to the require-
ments of the Article XX chapeau. See id. 185-86. However, the panel also noted:
In reaching these conclusions, we wish to underscore what we have not decided in this appeal.
We have not decided that the protection and preservation of the environment is of no signifi-
cance to the Members of the WTO. Clearly, it is. We have not decided that the sovereign
nations that are Members of the WTO cannot adopt effective measures to protect endangered
species, such as sea turtles. Clearly, they can and should. And we have not decided that sover-
eign states should not act together bilaterally, plurilaterally or multilaterally, either within the
WTO or in other international fora, to protect endangered species or to otherwise protect the
environment. Clearly, they should and do.
Id. 185.
33. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 1.1, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU] (applying only to
"disputes brought pursuant to the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the agreements
listed in Appendix 1 to this [Dispute Settlement Understanding]").
34. Id. art. 3.2.
2016 / Global Tobacco Control
instructs that when interpreting any treaty, the interpreter must account not
just for the treaty at hand but also for "[alny subsequent agreement between
the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its
provisions," as well as "[ajny relevant rules of international law applicable
in the relations between the parties. '"'
All of this suggests that a WTO panel may interpret the relevant WTO
rules in the context of relevant human rights or public health treaties. A
party to the panel proceedings could thus raise a public health or human
rights defense against a WTO claim in cases in which a public health or
human rights treaty required or authorized the state action, in which case
the WTO obligation should be read flexibly in the context of that other
body of international law. In a case in which following an explicit WTO
obligation would put the member state in violation of its legal obligations
under health and human rights law (and if the complainant state were also
bound by the same health or human rights norm), the WTO Dispute Settle-
ment Body would need to decide which of the two norms prevailed under
interpretive rules governing conflicts of international laws. 36 To be sure, the
defending nation would not automatically win by invoking the health and
human rights "trump card." For example, the defending nation could not
interpose the health and human rights concern as a pretext to engage in
violation of well-accepted free trade rules forbidding arbitrary and discrimi-
natory treatment.37 But if the health or human rights norm were found to be
35. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) (hereinafter VCLT]; see also Robert Howse, The Canadian Generic
Medicines Panel: A Dangerous Precedent in Dangerous Times, 3 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 493, 496, 501-02
(2000) (identifying how VCLT article 31(3) should have been applied in a past WTO case concerning
obligations under the TRIPS, one of the WTO covered agreements). In addition, Joost Pauwelyn has
pointed out: "the obligation in Article 11 of the DSU for panels to make an 'objective assessment of...
the applicability of ... relevant covered agreements' may require a panel to refer to and apply other rules
of international law; these other rules may show that the relevant WTO rules do not apply and have
therefore not been violated; in contrast, failure to look at these other rules would preclude an 'objective
assessment of ... the applicability of ... the relevant covered agreements."' Pauwelyn, Human Rights in
WTO Dispute Settlement, supra note 12, at 216 (quoting DSU, supra note 33, art. 11). A recent Appellate
Body decision provides further commentary on the role of the VCLT in WTO dispute settlement. See
Appellate Body Report, Peru - Additional Duty on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products, 6.4, WTO
Doc. WT/DS457/AB/R (adopted July 31, 2015) (finding that "Peru's arguments regarding the interpre-
tation of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture and Article II:l(b) of the GATT 1994 in accor-
dance with Article 31(3)(a) and (c) of the Vienna Convention [were] within the scope of the appeal," but
finding that the Panel did not commit an error by not interpreting the WTO provisions at issue under
Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention, since the challenged provisions of the Peru-Guatemala free trade
agreement and International Law Commission were not "relevant" to the interpretation within the
meaning of VCLT Article 31(3)(c)).
36. See generally JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: How
WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003) (explaining the relationship and
hierarchy between WTO law and other branches of international law).
37. For example, in the Clove Cigarettes case, a U.S. restriction was found to be discriminatory because
the United States had banned clove cigarettes, but not all other flavored cigarettes (e.g., menthol), which
appeared to raise the same health concerns. Appellate Body Report, United States - Measures Affecting the
Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, 234-36, WTO Doc.. WT/DS406/AB/R (adopted Apr. 24,
2012); see also Puig, supra note 3, at 399-400 (discussing the Clove Cigarettes case).
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legitimate and a conflict unavoidable, the panel could accept the human-
focused legal' justification and decline to find a WTO violation.' 8
Perhaps the most controversial use of a health and human rights argu-
ment would arise if a state used that argument as a sword. A party could
invoke human rights "offensively" to authorize executive action: for exam-
ple, human rights clauses in economic agreements concluded with the Euro-
pean Union could authorize a party to take "appropriate measures" to
suspend the trade preferences afforded to a state party that failed to comply
with human rights principles.3 9 A complainant could also invoke human
rights offensively in WTO adjudication, asking a panel to invalidate another
state's law whose legality was being defended on grounds of compliance
with WTO law. Assuming that the panel had jurisdiction to decide the
claims of any WTO violations, the panel should also be able to apply other
bodies of international law, including human rights and public health law,
in assessing the legality of the national regulations. While it seems unlikely
that a WTO panel would entertain, for example, a direct claim of violation
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,40 the terms
of the TBT Agreement permit challenges to a state's deviation from an "in-
ternational standard"-defined as "standards that are developed by interna-
tional bodies."41 If the meaning and application of the human rights rule
were clear-for example, a jus cogens rule-a WTO panel could apply it
directly. But if the meaning of the human rights rule were ambiguous, ad-
vice from the authoritative interpretive body regarding the human rights
treaty could be sought, not just to help the WTO panel to reach the most
correct decision, but also to maintain uniformity in the interpretation of the
human rights treaty.4 2
Thus, if a tobacco company or a proxy state43 were to invoke a human
rights claim to invalidate a national regulation implementing the FCTC, the
WTO panel could hear human rights arguments both in support of and
38. Cf Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Con-
taining Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R (adopted Apr. 5, 2011) (holding that the measure was
both provisionally justified under GATT Article XX(b) and under Article XX chapeau by reversing the
Panel's finding that asbestos and non-asbestos products were "like" products for the purposes of GATT
Art. 111:4 national treatment analysis).
39. See Pauwelyn, Human Rights in WTO Dispute Settlement, supra note 12, at 206.
40. Id.
41. Annex 1.2 of the TBT Agreement further defines "standard" as a "[djocument approved by a
recognized body that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for
products or related processes and production methods, with which compliance is not mandatory." TBT
Agreement, supra note 26, Annex 1.2. See also, e.g., Panel Report, European Communities - Trade Descrip-
tion of Sardines, 7.63-7.70, WTO Doc. WT/DS231/R (adopted Oct. 23, 2002) (finding that Codex
Stan 94, an international standard concerning the classification of sardines, was a relevant international
standard to use in examining the European Communities' sardine classification system).
42. See Pauwelyn, Human Rights in WTO Dispute Settlement, supra note 12, at 231.
43. See Puig, supra note 3, at 384 ("Whether by persuading WTO members like Ukraine with no
direct interest in the Australian tobacco market to bring a complaint, by paying the legal fees of coun-
tries like the Dominican Republic to argue for deregulation in the sector, or by relying on their web of
subsidiaries around the world to stimulate litigation before the World Bank's arbitration tribunals, Brit-
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against the measure. But if the national government were closely following
both FCTC and universally accepted human rights "standards," it should
have a successful defense on the merits against the challenge. 44 After all,
with respect to tobacco control, national governments complying with the
FCTC would not be acting arbitrarily, but rather, asserting and protecting
the human rights of their own inhabitants to be free of preventable disease.
In deciding such cases, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body should recognize
that in exercising its police power in such cases, the national government is
acting as parens patriae in the classical sense: a protector of the individual
rights of local residents to achieve the highest attainable level of public
health. A nation acting to control the epidemic of tobacco-related illnesses
would be doing so under the aegis of a widely subscribed international
agreement. To the extent that international adjudication recognizes that dis-
tinctive governmental role, it would have the effect of upholding public
health, human rights, and national sovereignty while also advancing a care-
fully considered and painstakingly negotiated global regulatory agenda.
Given all of this, an obvious question going forward is whether national
efforts to implement the FCTC faithfully should simply be exempted alto-
gether from invalidation in WTO dispute resolution. Some have proposed
that, as in the case of conflict diamonds, a supermajority of WTO members
should grant a formal waiver to WTO liability for national regulations that
comply with the FCTC.45 But this solution could require the consent of
those few WTO members who have signed, but not yet ratified, the
FCTC. 46 Alternatively, member states of the FCTC could agree to another
ish American Tobacco ("BAT") and Phillip Morris International ("PMI") are using international law to
limit antismoking regulations."); see also Leving, supra note 24.
44. Indeed, one of the agreements most relevant to tobacco plain packaging claims, the TBT Agree-
ment, addresses the incorporation of standards in just this fashion. See Jamie Strawbridge, U.S. Implemen-
tation of Adverse WTO Rulings: A Closer Look at the Tuna-Dolphin, COOL, and Clove Cigarettes Cases, ASIL
(Oct. 30, 2013), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/17/issue/23/us-implementation-adverse-wto-rul-
ings-closer-look-tuna-dolphin-cool-and. To the extent that a technical regulation "in accordance with" a
relevant international standard is presumed not to create "an unnecessary obstacle to international trade,"
pursuant to TBT Agreement Article 2.5, compliance with a valid human rights standard would arguably
create a safe harbor "shield" against a claim of WTO violation. See Pauwelyn, Human Rights in WTO
Dispute Settlement, supra note 12, at 223-24. Cf Appellate Body Report, United States - Continued Suspen-
sion ofObligations in the EC - Hormones Dispute, 590, WTO Doc. WT/DS320/AB/R (explaining that a
panel should defer to a member state's risk assessment under the SPS Agreement, so long as "[the] risk
assessment is supported by coherent reasoning and respectable scientific evidence," a standard the FCTC
tobacco regulations easily meet).
45. See GATT, supra note 25, art. XXV:5 ("In exceptional circumstances not elsewhere provided for
in this Agreement, the Contracting Parties may waive an obligation imposed upon a contracting party by
this Agreement; [p~rovided that any such decision shall be approved by a two-thirds majority of the votes
cast and that such majority shall comprise more than half of the contracting parties."); Werner Meng,
Conflicting Rules in the WHO FCTC and Their Impact, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
334, 334-339 (Thomas Cottier et al. eds., 2005) (considering the possibility of a WTO waiver for
tobacco regulations, parallel to the Kimberley Waiver for restrictions on conflict diamonds). The Mar-
rakesh Agreement, supra note 11, art. IX:3, provides that a WTO Member may waive a WTO obligation
only if approved by three-fourths of members.
46. Currently, only eleven WTO Members have not ratified the FCTC. Four have not yet signed or
ratified the FCTC: the Dominican Republic, Indonesia, Liechtenstein, and Malawi. See Status of the WHO
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protocol to that treaty explicitly stating its primacy or exempting regula-
tions implemented under its aegis from dispute resolution under prior trea-
ties concluded among the member states that have ratified that protocol,
including the WTO. 47 In the end, it is perhaps most likely that the issue
would be resolved through simple treaty interpretation. The final text of the
FCTC tellingly omitted two provisions that would have confirmed the pri-
ority of WTO law over the Convention. 48 Accordingly, in an interpretive
dispute between two states parties to both the WTO and the FCTC, the
panel could reasonably conclude that the Tobacco Convention constituted
the treaty that is both later-in-time and more specific in content, and hence
should prevail under the rules of treaty interpretation governing lex specialis
between the two parties. 49
As this Article went to press, an ICSID tribunal issued a sweeping award
rejecting tobacco industry claims in an investor-state arbitration brought by
Philip Morris and sub-entities against Uruguay under the Switzerland-Uru-
guay Bilateral Investment Treaty ("BIT").50 The complainants challenged
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), FCTC (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.fctc.org/images/
stories/docs/ratifications/larestratifications.pdf. Seven others have signed but nor yet ratified the frame-
work convention: Argentina, Cuba, Haiti, Morocco, Mozambique, Switzerland, and the United States. See
WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION (last visited July
7, 2016), https://creaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src =TREATY&mtdsg-no= IX-4&chap-
ter=9&lang=en. Significantly, other WTO Members that did not sign the FCTC prior to the June 29,
2004, signature deadline can still become parties to the FCTC through accession.
47. The FCTC seeks to operate by consensus on any proposed amendment or protocol to the Conven-
tion. However, when a consensus cannot be reached, an amendment or protocol can be "adopted by a
three-quarters majority vote of the Parties present and voting at the session." Therefore, if all 180 Parties
to the FCTC were present and voting at a given session, 135 of them would need to vote in favor of the
amendment or protocol, if a consensus cannot be reached. See FCTC, supra note 19, arts. 28(3), 33(2). It
should be noted that the Punta del Este Declaration of 2010, issued by the Conference of FCTC parties
soon after Phillip Morris first initiated its case against Uruguay, pointedly recalls that the general excep-
tion stated in Article XX(b) of the GATT gives WTO Members significant flexibility to design and
implement measures to protect public health, provided that the measures are adopted and implemented
in good faith and do not arbitrarily discriminate or restrict international trade. See Conference of the
Parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, Punta del Este Declaration on the Imple-
mentation of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, FCTC/COP4(5) (Nov. 19, 2010), http://
apps.who.int/gb/fctc/PDF/cop4/FCTCCOP4(5)-en.pdf.
48. See Meng, supra note 45, at 335; see also Joost Pauwelyn, WTO Compassion or Superiority Complex?:
What to Make of the WTO Waiver for "Conflict Diamonds," 24 MICH, J. INT'L L. 1177, 1201-02 (2003).
49. See VCLT, supra note 35, art. 30(3) ("When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to
the later treaty . . .the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with
those of the later treaty."); see also Meng, supra note 45, at 335; Pauwelyn, supra note 12, at 208, 217-18.
50. The complainants were two Swiss companies, Philip Morris Brands SARL and Philip Morris
Products S.A., and their Uruguayan subsidiary Abal Hermanos S.A. Piero Bernardini, the Chair, and
James Crawford, now Judge on the International Court of Justice, formed the panel majority and Gary
Born issued a partial dissent. See Philip Morris Brands SARL (Swirz.), Philip Morris Products S.A.
(Switz.), & Abal Hermanos S.A. (Uru.) v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7,
Award, 1, 2, 18, 590 (July 8, 2016) [hereinafter Philip Morris v. Uruguay Award], http://www
.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7417.pdf; see also Philip Morris Brands SARL
(Switz.), Philip Morris Products S.A. (Switz.), & Abal Hermanos S.A. (Uru.) v. Oriental Republic of
Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Gary Born, 1 (July
8, 2016), [hereinafter Philip Morris v. Uruguay Partial Dissent], http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/italaw7417.pdf.
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two aspects of Uruguay's tobacco control regulations adopted under the
leadership of Uruguay's president, an oncologist, consistent with the FCTC:
an "80 percent requirement," requiring that tobacco packages dedicate up
to eighty percent of display areas to graphic and textual health warnings,
and a Single Presentation Requirement, which limited each tobacco brand
to one packaging variant, to avoid misleading consumers into believing that
some variants were "healthier" than others." The arbitration award rejected
each of Philip Morris' core claims, reaffirming many of the arguments out-
lined above.12
Joined on key points by the partial dissent, the tribunal majority applied
an interpretive approach with potentially broad precedential value for future
international tobacco litigation. First, in rejecting Philip Morris' claims and
upholding the legality of Uruguay's regulations, the tribunal accepted the
relevance of arguments made by public health authorities"3 and espoused by
human rights tribunals.' 4 Second, the tribunal ruled that the BIT should be
interpreted in light of well-established customary international law recog-
nizing the protection of public health as an "essential manifestation of the
State's police power," so that economically affected investors might not
claim compensation for expropriation in cases in which they claimed dam-
ages flowing from bona fide governmental public health measures." Third,
all three arbitrators recognized the need for deference-and in the case of
the majority, a "margin of appreciation" similar to that frequently invoked
by the European Court of Human Rights-to national authorities making
public health regulatory choices.' 6 Indeed, the tribunal's deferential review
51. See Philip Morris v. Uruguay Award, 9-11; see also Larry Rohter, In Uruguay, the President Also
Reads Mammograms, N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 31, 2006, at A3.
52. See Philip Morris v. Uruguay Award, 590.
53. The tribunal noted with approval third-party briefs filed by the World Health Organization and
the Pan-American Health Organization, arguing that "the Challenged Measures were not 'arbitrary and
unnecessary' but rather were potentially 'effective means to protecting public health."' Id. 306; see also
id. 38-39, 42-43, 141, 361, 391, 393, 407.
54. See id. 295. In particular, Dissenter Born cited a range of human rights instruments confirming
that "access to a judicial forum is the most basic guarantee of justice," and suggesting that Uruguay
should have provided some forum to challenge the TCA ruling. See Philip Morris v. Uruguay Partial
Dissent, $$ 44-72.
55. See Philip Morris v. Uruguay Award, 7 290-91; see generally Kate Mitchell, Philip Morris v.
Uruguay: An Affirmation of 'Police Powers' and 'Regulatory Power in the Public Interest' in International Invest-
ment Law, EJIL: Talk! (July 28, 2016), http://www.ejiltalk.org/philip-morris-v-uruguay-an-affirmation-
of-police-powers-and-regulatory-power-in-the-public-interest-in-internationa-investment-law/.
56. See Philip Morris v. Uruguay Award, 388, 391-96, 399. The majority resoundingly rejected
the complainants' claim that the notion of "margin of appreciation" does not apply in BIT arbitration,
declaring "[tlhe responsibility for public health measures rests with the government and investment
tribunals should pay great deference to governmental judgments of national needs in matters such as the
protection of public health." See id. 399. The Tribunal also found that "the present case concerns a
legislative policy decision taken against the background of a strong scientific consensus as to the lethal
effects of tobacco. Substantial deference is due in that regard to national authorities' decisions as to the
measures which should be taken to address an acknowledged and major public health problem." Id.
418. The partial dissent declined to apply the margin of appreciation but nevertheless found that the
terms of the BIT, customary international law, and arbitral decisions "mandate substantial deference to
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extended not just to actions of the national political branches, but also to
decisions by the national judiciary. Over a dissent, the tribunal majority
rejected Philip Morris' claim that national court decisions upholding the
legality of the challenged tobacco regulations constituted a denial of justice
under international law. 57
Fourth, the tribunal agreed that Uruguay had not just the power, but also
the duty to protect public health flowing both from domestic and interna-
tional law, including multilateral health conventions to which Uruguay is a
party, like the FCTC. Indeed, the tribunal specified a test: regulatory mea-
sures are legitimate exercises of the police power if they are "taken bona fide
for the purpose of protecting the public welfare, [and are] non-discrimina-
tory and proportionate."5 8 Regulations that met that standard constituted
neither unlawful expropriation nor violations of the legal duty of fair and
equitable treatment.
Because only Uruguay was party to the FCTC, the arbitrators did not
address specific legal questions regarding the relationship between the BIT
and the tobacco treaty. But the majority's analysis contained important
precedents regarding how national authorities may exercise their regulatory
power in tobacco cases. The award suggested that countries "with limited
technical and economic resources" bore no duty to "perform additional
studies or to gather further evidence in support of the Challenged Measures"
before regulating to implement the FCTC obligations.5 9 Nor did a regulat-
ing state need to prove definitively that its regulatory measure had suc-
ceeded in reducing smoking, so long as it showed that the challenged
measure, when adopted, was a "reasonable" attempt to address a genuine
public health concern. 60 Given the difficulty of isolating the causal impact
of any individual regulatory measure on tobacco consumption, the tribunal
found it sufficient not only that the incidence of smoking in Uruguay had
recently declined, but als6 "that these were public health measures which
were directed to this end and were capable of contributing to its achieve-
ment. "61 Thus, a national government could adopt a novel regulation not
yet seen in any other jurisdiction, so long as it had some rational basis and
was not discriminatory.
Underscoring the special health concerns raised by tobacco, with respect
to expropriation, the tribunal rejected complainants' suggestion that the to-
Uruguay's regulatory and legislative judgments, and forbid any second-guessing of such judgments."
Philip Morris v. Uruguay Partial Dissent, 87, 138-39.
57. The majority found that the Uruguayan court decisions upholding the challenged measures in-
volved "procedural improprieties" and "a failure of form" but were not sufficiently "serious" or "egre-
gious" to violate the denial-of-justice provision of the BIT. See Philip Morris v. Uruguay Award, 11
552-81.
58. See id. 305.
59. See id. I 393, 396.
60. See id. 409.
61. See id. 306.
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bacco regulations disrupted their legitimate expectations at the time of in-
vestment: "[oln the contrary, in light of widely accepted articulations of
international concern for the harmful effect of tobacco, the expectation could
only have been of progressively more stringent regulation of the sale and use
of tobacco products. ' '6 2 With regard to Philip Morris' claimed property
rights in trademark, the tribunal found tobacco to be one of those products
"whose presentation to the market needs to be stringently controlled with-
out being prohibited entirely." 63 Canvassing both domestic and interna-
tional trademark law, the majority found nothing in any of these legal
sources that "supports the conclusion that a trademark amounts to an abso-
lute, inalienable right to use that is somehow protected or guaranteed
against any regulation that might limit or restrict its use." 64 Thus, while
the tobacco companies' trademark rights arguably entitled them to exclude
third parties from using those marks, those rights were still subject to the
state's overriding "regulatory power" over the complainants' own use of
such trademarks. 65
The Uruguay decision will stand as an unequivocal landmark rebuke of
the tobacco industry's trade arguments. Philip Morris has now twice
failed-once on jurisdiction, and now on the merits-to defeat in investor-
state arbitration national laws restricting tobacco packaging to promote
public health. 66 Perhaps most striking, the award not only resoundingly re-
jected the tobacco complainants' arguments on the merits, but also ordered
those complainants to pay $7 million of Uruguay's CoStS. 6 7 The unusual
order reflects both the majority's view of the weakness of Uruguay's substan-
tive case and its willingness to deter Philip Morris and other tobacco compa-
nies from chilling further regulatory efforts by filing similar baseless
arbitrations against other sovereign regulators. For the longer term, the
award confirms the three points I have argued above: human rights and
public health arguments are relevant in international trade law cases; these
arguments can legitimately shield bona fide regulatory efforts from interna-
tional law attack; and the legal interpretations of investment tribunals must
show their awareness of and sensitivity to the unique danger of tobacco.
62. See id. 430.
63. See id. 270.
64. See id. 268. The tribunal reviewed not only Uruguay's trademark law, but also other interna-
tional intellectual property instruments to which Uruguay is a party, such as the WTO TRIPS agree-
ment, the Paris Convention, and the MERCOSUR Protocol. See id. 172-73, 260-71.
65. See id. 271.
66. In December 2015, an arbitration panel formed under the Hong Kong-Australia BIT rejected, on
jurisdictional grounds, Philip Morris's challenge to a sweeping Australian tobacco packaging law. See
Philip Morris Asia Ltd. (Hong Kong) v. Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2012-12, Award on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, pt. VII (Dec. 17, 2015).
67, See Philip Morris v. Uruguay Award, 588.
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III. TOBACCO CONTROL AS A GLOBAL BATTLEGROUND AND A
LITMUS TEST OF WTO LEGITIMACY
Freer trade has undeniably helped to spur the global tobacco epidemic. As
two commentators have recently noted, "[tlobacco's global success is partly
the result of free trade agreements that mandate[d] the removal of import
taxes and other commercial restrictions of most goods, including tobacco
products." 6 Fortunately, because of expanded scientific awareness and dra-
matically increased health warnings in the United States during the half
century since the U.S. Surgeon General's landmark report,69 tobacco con-
sumption in the Northern Hemisphere has sharply declined. But to keep its
profit shares up, the global tobacco industry has shifted course and increas-
ingly sought to export its products to the developing world, with all the
accompanying risks of addiction, sickness, and death. More than three-
quarters of the world's smokers now live in the developing world, with to-
bacco consumption there more than doubling in the last three decades of the
twentieth century.70
When national regulators in these developing countries have sought to
invoke provisions of the FCTC to warn their local consumers of the undenia-
ble dangers of these imported products, the industry has challenged those
national regulations as violations of international trade and investment
laws.71 Developing nations have considered tobacco control legislation, but
68. See Sergio Puig & Gregory Shaffer, A Breakthrough with the TPP: The Tobacco Carve-out, 16 YALE J.
HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 1), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract-id=2772277 ("Both Republican and Democratic administrations have supported the
tobacco industry in trade deals, coupled with over a hundred years of domestic subsidies for tobacco
growers and tobacco exports that were only ended (at least for now) in 2014.").
69. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., SMOKING AND HEALTH: REPORT OF THE ADVI-
SORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE (1964), https://
profiles.nlm.nih.gov/NN/B/B/M/Q/; U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH CON-
SEQUENCES OF SMOKING-50 YEARS OF PROGRESS: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 846 (2014)
(indicating that in the last half-century, adult smoking rates in the United States-have fallen from 42.7%
in 1965 to 18.1% in 2012); see also Ahmed Jamal et al., Current Cigarette Smoking Among Adults-United
States, 2005-2014, at 1233 (Ctrs, for Disease Control and Prevention, Morbidity and Mortality Wkly.
Rep. Vol. 64, No. 44, 2015), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/wk/mm6444.pdf (placing the adult smok-
ing rate in 2014 at 16.8% and demonstrating a further reduction in the adult smoking rate); Fiore, supra
note 9.
70. See FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, PROJECTIONS OF TOBACCO PRODUCTION,
CONSUMPTION AND TRADE TO THE YEAR 2010, at 7, 9, 12 (2003), http://www.fao.org/3/a-y4956epdf
(noting that much of the increase has occurred in China, as well as Africa, where smoking rates had
traditionally been low); Tobacco, WHO (June 2016), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs339/
en/.
71. See Sabrina Tavernise, Tobacco Industry Tactics Limit Poorer Nations' Smoking Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
13, 2013, at Al. Two provisions of the FCTC deserve particular mention: article 11, which calls for
national regulation of packaging and labeling of tobacco products, and article 13, which calls for national
limitations upon tobacco advertising, promotion, and sponsorship. See FCTC, supra note 19, arts. 11, 13.
Australia and Uruguay have taken the lead in enacting laws implementing these treaty provisions. See
Tavernise, supra. In these cases, the tobacco industry has tried to seize the human rights argument, argu-
ing that such laws infringe their rights to commercial speech, advertising, and intellectual property. See
Philip Morris Asia Ltd. (Hong Kong) v. Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2012-12, Notice of
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the tobacco companies have bombarded them with threats of international
litigation, chilling their regulatory efforts. And now, the global tobacco in-
dustry has engaged in a massive forum-shopping exercise in numerous liti-
gation and arbitration fora to challenge tobacco control measures
worldwide. 72 Their increasingly visible global litigation campaign 73  now
rages not just in national courts and the WTO Dispute Settlement Body,
but also in arbitration under Free Trade Agreements ("FTAs") 74 and BITS.7 1
Where the industry is jurisdictionally barred from suing directly-for ex-
ample, in WTO cases requiring state complainants-it has enlisted a
strange list of governmental bedfellows. 76 Whether directly or through gov-
ernmental surrogates, tobacco companies are now litigating internationally
to challenge such tobacco control measures as plain packaging requirements;
brand registration and presentation requisites; marketing and advertising
restrictions; health risk labeling laws; price, import, and export controls;
and import and export taxes.7 7 In an unusually candid speech, WHO Direc-
tor-General Dr. Margaret Chan warned that such tobacco company litiga-
tion measures were "deliberately designed to [instill] fear" in countries
Claim, 10(a), 31, 33 (June 22, 2012); Phillip Morris Brands Sari v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay,
ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Request for Arbitration, 43 (Feb. 19, 2010). But in defense of their
regulations, these countries have responded that the legal requirements are nondiscriminatory, necessary
measures designed to protect human health and to give effect to the FCTC; are not more trade-restrictive
than necessary; and do not interfere with effective protection of tobacco-related trademarks. See Phillip
Morris Brands Sarl v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Uruguay's Memorial on
Jurisdiction, 102-105, 116, 122, 132 (Sept. 24, 2011); Philip Morris Asia Ltd. (Hong Kong) v.
Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2012-12, Australia's Response to the Notice of Arbitration,
38-39, 41, 46, 53 (Dec. 21, 2011).
72. Philip Morris alone has helped generate one-third of the thirty-nine international litigation cases.
See Puig, supra note 3, at 393 n.51.
73. For a hilarious, devastating, but ultimately chilling, video expos6 of how the industry has sup-
ported and financed this global litigation campaign, see Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Tobacco (HBO),
YOUTUBE (Feb. 15, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6UsHHOCH4q8. See also Ryan Parker,
John Oliver Targets Cigarettes on 'Last Week Tonight'; Philip Morris Reacts, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2015), htrp://
www.latimes.com/entertainment/tv/showtracker/la-et-st-philip-morris-john-oliver20150216-story
.html.
74. See, e.g., Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd. v. United States of America, UNCITRAL,
Final Award (Jan. 12, 2011) (dismissing the NAFTA chapter 11 arbitration case for lack of jurisdiction
over claims concerning compensation for tobacco regulation measures).
75. See, e.g., Philip Morris Asia Ltd. (Hong Kong) v. Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2012-12,
Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 5, 589 (Dec. 17, 2015) (brought under the Hong Kong-
Australia BIT but ultimately dismissed for lack of jurisdiction).
76. As Professor Puig notes, Cuba paradoxically challenged Australia's tobacco regulation as a viola-
tion of trademark rights, even though the Cuban government had sought to abolish intellectual property
only half a century earlier. See Puig, supra note 3, at 383-84. Health campaigners have also been baffled
by the now-abandoned WTO suit brought against Australia by Ukraine, which has little to no bilateral
trade with Australia and is a party to the FCTC. See Tom Miles, Ukraine Drops WTO Action Against
Australian Tobacco-packaging Laws, REUTERS (June 3, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/wto-tobacco-
idUSL5NOYP3S420150603.
77. See Leving, supra note 24; Puig, supra note 3, at 396; see also cases cited in note 24, supra. For an
illuminating analysis of how tobacco taxes can reduce consumption and promote public health, see Jason
Furman, Chairman, Council of Econ. Advisers, Address at World Bank Conference: Six Lessons from the
U.S. Experience with Tobacco Taxes (May 24, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
page/files/20160524_cea-tobaccotax-speech.pdf.
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trying to reduce smoking.78 "The wolf is no longer in sheep's clothing," she
warned, "and its teeth are bared.."79
Having helped to create this problem, trade law and institutions can now
also become a part of the solution. The WTO can begin by recognizing that
a health and human rights crisis of this magnitude should not be treated as
business as usual. Both the nature and the scale of the problem are unique.
To quote the World Health Organization, tobacco is "the only legally avail-
able product that kills up to one half of its regular users when consumed as
recommended by its manufacturer."s ° Freer trade seeks, inter alia, to reduce
prices, raise consumption, and improve public welfare. Yet expanded to-
bacco trade has the opposite effect on welfare. By reducing tariffs, trade
agreements increase tobacco consumption, with a devastating effect on pub-
lic health. Rather than creating a positive sum game for both nations, more
trade reduces the welfare of the importing nation. As tobacco consumption
expands, so too does the inevitable addiction, disease, and death, with at-
tendant declines in consumer productivity and public health, and accompa-
nying increases in health care costs.8' In that light, industry attacks
designed to undercut national preventive efforts-particularly those taken
under FCTC auspices-should be seen for what they are: a fundamental
assault, in the guise of protecting free trade, on the very public health and
human rights values that the WTO is supposed to protect.
To put things in perspective: suppose a developing nation uncovered a
communicable disease that, each year, contributed to thousands of deaths and
illnesses. Suppose further that the same disease caused 6 million global
deaths annually, in the last century killed an estimated 100 million people,
and if present trends continued, would kill about 1 billion people in the
twenty-first century. Let us suppose further that the primary vector of this
horrible disease was an ultra-hazardous foreign consumer product, scientifi-
cally demonstrated to kill up to one-half of its users when used as intended
by its manufacturers.
Under such circumstances, is there any real doubt that the regulating
nation could use the full scope of its police powers to combat this deadly
disease through every vector that it might be transmitted, or that in com-
bating this health threat, the nation's regulations would be entitled to a
wide margin of appreciation? Is there any real dispute that, as part of that
regulatory effort, the regulating state could require consumer advertising to
carry urgent messages warning people of the dangers, and discouraging and
78. Dr. Margaret Chan, Director-General of the WTO, Keynote Address at the 15th World Confer-
ence on Tobacco or Health: The Changed Face of the Tobacco Industry (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www
.who.int/dg/speeches/2012/tobacco_20120 3 20/en/.
79. Id.
80. Tobacco Free Initiative (TFI), WHO, http://www.who.int/tobacco/industry/product-regulation/
background/en/ (last visited May 29, 2016).
81. See Puig, supra note 3, at 410.
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"debiasing" them82 -at the point of consumption-from ingesting the
causes of the communicable disease? Would any court deny the regulating
state broad discretion to bar private merchants, foreign or domestic, from
disguising the agents that transmit this deadly disease with bright and at-
tractive packaging that might mislead vulnerable consumers-especially
children-to unwittingly addict, sicken, and ultimately kill themselves by
consuming the lethal product? And would it really violate world trade and
investment laws if national regulators combated the companies' deceptive
marketing tactics by proactively telling the truth about tobacco consump-
tion to the vulnerable-particularly the poor, children, and women-whom
the industry especially targets?
Although all concede that tobacco is a lethal product that addicts, sick-
ens, and kills when used as intended, manufacturers keep marketing that
product aggressively by glamorizing and normalizing its use, while mini-
mizing its health risks. For decades, multinational tobacco companies pur-
sued their regulatory challenges in domestic courts and suffered a string of
well-publicized defeats.83 Yet having failed to make their case in national
litigation, multinational tobacco companies have now gone global in their
litigation efforts, shopping for sympathetic global fora in which they may
repackage their claims as violations of global trade and investment law. To
forestall such abuse of the system of international dispute settlement, the
recently concluded Trans-Pacific Partnership ("TPP") has adopted an his-
toric "tobacco carve-out," which permits TPP members to block corpora-
82. For an insightful analysis of the value of "government debiasing" through tobacco warnings, see
Christine Jolls, Product Warnings, Debiasing, and Free Speech: The Case of Tobacco Regulation, 169 J. INSTITU-
TIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 53, 53-78 (2013).
83. See, e.g., JT International SA v. Commonwealth of Australia [2012] HCA 43 (Austl.); British
American Tobacco Australasia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Australia [2012] HCA 43 (Austl.) (upholding
Australia's plain packaging law). In the United States alone, the extensive litigation concerning the
Tobacco Massive Settlement Agreement ("MSA") placed restrictions on particular advertising methods
and required that tobacco companies pay states for the funding of tobacco prevention programs. To date,
no U.S. court has held that the MSA or any of its related measures violate U.S. law. See KT&G Corp. v.
Att'y Gen. of Oklahoma, 535 F.3d 1114 (10th Cit. 2008) (affirming decisions of Kansas and Oklahoma
courts, which dismissed claims alleging that the Kansas and Oklahoma allocable share amendments
violate the Sherman Act and the U.S. Constitution); Tritent Int'l Corp. v. Kentucky, 467 F.3d 547 (6th
Cit. 2006) (affirming dismissal of claims alleging that Kentucky escrow statute and complementary
legislation were preempted by the Sherman Act); Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 408 F.3d 112 (2d
Cit. 2005) (affirming denial of preliminary injunction against enforcement of New York escrow statute
and complementary legislation); Star Scientific Inc. v. Beales, 278 F.3d 339 (4th Cit. 2002) (affirming
dismissal of claims alleging that the MSA violated the Compact Clause, and that the Virginia escrow
statute violated the Due Process, Equal Protection, and Commerce Clauses); Grand River Enterprises Six
Nations, Ltd. v. Beebe, 418 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (W.D. Ark. 2006) (holding that Arkansas allocable share
amendment did not violate the Sherman Act, the First Amendment, the Due Process Clause, the Equal
Protection Clause, the Commerce Clause, or the Supremacy Clause); Omaha Tribe of Nebraska v. Miller,
311 F. Supp. 2d 816 (S.D. Iowa 2004) (dismissing Indian Commerce Clause and federal law preemption
challenges to Iowa escrow statute by cigarette manufacturer owned by Indian tribe); Sanders v. Lockyer,
365 F. Supp. 2d 1093 (N.D. Cal. 2005), affd sub norn. Sanders v. Brown, 504 F.3d 903 (9th Cit. 2007)
(affirming dismissal of antitrust claims regarding the MSA).
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tions from using the Investor-State Dispute Settlement ("ISDS") mechanism
to win compensation from injury attributed to tobacco control measures.8 4
Going forward, the battle over global tobacco control seems destined to
provide a litmus test for the very legitimacy of the WTO dispute settlement
process. The question will be whether responsible national governments
have a right and duty to regulate to protect their residents' public health
without being subjected to aggressive, meritless arbitration under economic
treaties adopted for other purposes. To the contrary, those regulations are
part and parcel of a global movement legally mandating government protec-
tion of public health through tobacco regulation. The national laws being
challenged in global litigation are not, as the tobacco industry would por-
tray them, aberrational trade restrictions or isolated intrusions upon private
investments. Rather, they are essential regulatory measures that seek-as an
exercise of transnational legal process-to internalize globally blessed regu-
latory solutions as part of a vital, considered effort to protect public health
and human rights.85 For trade and investment panels to read their governing
laws to invalidate such carefully crafted national public health regulations
would undermine their own legitimacy and thrust them inappropriately
into the world of global health management.
A regulating state's international trade and investment obligations must
be construed in light of the broader legal framework of public health and
human rights against which their litigation arises. 86 Of course, trade and
investment laws are critically important, but they are not the only relevant
bodies of international law that govern human behavior. Nor were these
bodies of law ever intended to undermine thoughtful global efforts to pro-
tect public health and human rights. Indeed, the WTO Agreements explic-
itly contemplate this by recognizing public health exceptions in the GATT,
the General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS"), the SPS, and the
TBT.87 WTO panels should not construe their governing laws so blindly as
to disrupt this worldwide public health initiative. Nations have binding
legal obligations to protect the lives and health of their citizens against
84. See generally Puig & Shaffer, supra note 68.
85. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599
(1997) (describing transnational legal process as a reiterative process of interaction, interpretation, and
internalization).
86. Cf Chemtura Corp. v. Canada, UNCITRAL, Award, 137 (Aug. 2, 2010) (taking notice of
Canada's broader international treaty obligations to protect public health, and finding that the "broader
factual context is relevant in assessing" the reasonableness and lawfulness of Canada's regulation that
banned sales of an agricultural pesticide).
87. See SPS Agreement, supra note 26; GATT, supra note 25, art. XX(b); General Agreement on Trade
in Services art. XVI, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183 [hereinafter
GATS]; see also TBT Agreement, supra note 26, art. 2.2 ("For this purpose, technical regulations shall not
be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-
fulfilment would create. Such legitimate objectives [include] . . . protection of human health or safety,
animal or plant life or health, or the environment. In assessing such risks, relevant elements of considera-
tion [include] available scientific and technical information, related processing technology or intended
end-uses of products.").
2016 / Global Tobacco Control
hazards to human health, including the harmful effects of tobacco consump-
tion. When tobacco companies trade or invest in those countries, they do so
with full notice that the deadly products they market will be subject to
these strict legal mandates.
CONCLUSION
Going forward, the international lawfulness of global tobacco controls
will almost surely emerge as a litmus test of the WTO's legitimacy. Al-
though written in the context of investment arbitration, the Uruguay deci-
sion is a critical first step. As that ruling recognized, arbitration panels may
undoubtedly consider human rights and public health concerns as legitimate
background for interpretation and, depending on the circumstances, may
treat human rights and public health as both a shield and a sword with
respect to national regulation. Thus, over its next two decades, the WTO
dispute settlement bodies will be tested by how sensitively they include
consideration of the "human-focused" bodies of public international law in
their trade deliberations, particularly law governing human rights and pub-
lic health.
Even those who fear that such cases will divert trade panels from their
original mission should recognize the compelling case for "tobacco excep-
tionalism" in world trade law. International law and institutions cannot sen-
sibly treat tobacco as just another traded product. When Joseph Kony,
leader of the Lord's Resistance Army, seizes more than 100,000 child
soldiers, forces them to kill other children, and then enslaves more children
to take their place, international law has no difficulty condemning those acts
as "war crimes."88 But when a billion-dollar global industry knowingly ad-
dicts a vastly larger number of children-causing 6 million deaths annually
and then addicts more children to take their place-its defenders seek to
immunize those acts under trade and investment law as protected "free
trade." Of course, international law cannot redress all wrongs. But how can
it maintain its credibility if it does not treat these tragedies in proportion?
88. See Case Information Sheet, International Criminal Court, Situation in Uganda: The Prosecutor v.
Joseph Kony and Vincent Otti (Sept. 10, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/uganda/kony/Documents/Kony-
EtAlEng.pdf.

